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</o:shapelayout></xml><![endif]--></head><body lang=EN-US link=blue vlink=purple><div class=WordSection1><p class=MsoNormal><i>State v. Copeland<o:p></o:p></i></p><p class=MsoNormal><u>Date Filed:</u> 12/29/2011<o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal>Case #: A143210<o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal>Haselton, P.J. for the Court; Armstrong, J.; Sercombe, J. concurring<o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal>Full Text Opinion: <a href="http://www.publications.ojd.state.or.us/A143210.pdf">http://www.publications.ojd.state.or.us/A143210.pdf</a><o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal><o:p> </o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal>Constitutional Law: The public records hearsay exception is not<o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal>limited to collateral matters only because 1) prior case history<o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal>discussing the matter does not distinguish between “collateral” and<o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal>essential facts, and 2) the framers of the Oregon Constitution<o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal>incorporated several exceptions from the common law, including the<o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal>public records exception.<o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal><o:p> </o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal>Defendant’s wife sought, and was granted, a restraining order baring<o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal>defendant from approaching within 150 feet of her. The Multnomah<o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal>County Deputy Sherriff certified by proof of service that he<o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal>personally served defendant with the restraining order. Two months<o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal>after defendant was served, his wife observed him through a window of<o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal>a bar that was within 150 of the Savoy Tavern, a bar his wife<o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal>frequented and a bar he was barred from approaching. Subsequently, the<o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal>defendant was arrested, but objected at trial to the state’s offering<o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal>of proof of service as notice of the restraining order on the grounds<o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal>that it violated his rights to confrontation under the United States<o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal>Constitution, because the state did not offer testimony by the<o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal>notifying officer, or show he was unavailable. The state countered<o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal>that proof of service was an exception under the public records<o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal>hearsay exception. On appeal, defendant argued that the public records<o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal>exception was not so broad as the state contended, and only covered<o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal>“collateral” matters. The Court of Appeals analyzed prior case law<o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal>from State v. Conway and State v. William and held that neither case<o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal>limited the public records exception to collateral matters only.<o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal>Rather, because neither case distinguished between “collateral” and<o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal>essential, “noncollateral,” facts, and the framers of the Oregon<o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal>Constitution incorporated several exceptions from the common law –<o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal>including the public records exception – the public records hearsay<o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal>exception was not limited to collateral matters only. <i>Affirmed<o:p></o:p></i></p><p class=MsoNormal><i><o:p> </o:p></i></p><p class=MsoNormal><i>State v. Caldwell<o:p></o:p></i></p><p class=MsoNormal><u>Date Filed:</u> 12/29/11<o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal>Case #: A145511<o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal>Haselton, P.J. for the Court; Armstrong, J. & Duncan, J.<o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal>Full Text Opinion: <a href="http://www.publications.ojd.state.or.us/A145511.pdf">www.publications.ojd.state.or.us/A145511.pdf</a><o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal><o:p> </o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal>Post-Conviction Relief: The mere existence of a restraining order does<o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal>not constitute corroborating evidence sufficient to warrant a<o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal>conviction for violation of a restraining order when the only other<o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal>evidence presented by the state is the defendant's confession.<o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal><o:p> </o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal>Defendant had been served with a restraining order against Weiss.<o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal>Weiss was in the process of speaking with an officer regarding a<o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal>complaint that defendant violated the restraining order when defendant<o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal>called Weiss on the phone. The interviewing officer answered, and<o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal>defendant admitted to knowing of the existence of the restraining<o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal>order. Defendant later admitted to police that he had sent 25 text<o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal>messages to Weiss. Defendant was charged with 25 counts of contempt<o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal>for violating the restraining order. The first 24 were based on the<o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal>text messages, while count 25 was based on the phone call to Weiss.<o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal>Defendant was only convicted of counts 1 and 25, but argued on appeal<o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal>that the conviction on count 1 should be reversed because the state<o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal>presented no corroborating evidence to prove its case, only the<o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal>statement by defendant that he sent the text messages. The trial court<o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal>based its conviction on the fact that the issuance of the restraining<o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal>order constituted corroboration. The Court of Appeals found that the<o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal>existence of the restraining order alone did not constitute<o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal>corroboration, and that the state was required to present some other<o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal>extrinsic evidence beyond defendant’s confession in order to warrant a<o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal>conviction on count 1. <i>Reversed as to count 1; otherwise affirmed.<o:p></o:p></i></p><p class=MsoNormal><o:p> </o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal><o:p> </o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal><o:p> </o:p></p></div>
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